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Abstract
Link layer network coding (LLNC) promises to provide high throughput in relay networks through combining packets
at the relays and trading communication for computation. The emerging area of physical layer network coding (PLNC)
exploits the electromagnetic nature of signals and eliminates the need for addition at the packet level, while making
signal design and coding schemes adaptable to the channel conditions. Although network coding has been
extensively studied recently, physical layer network coding has not received the attention it deserves. Several recent
works introduced the pollution attack at the network layer; however, the network performance at the physical layer
with pollution attacks has not been evaluated before. The main challenge with the pollution attack involves
propagation of the corrupted packets in an epidemic manner, which degrades performance of the network. As PLNC
schemes boost up the network throughput, a thorough study evaluating this superiority to the LLNC scheme in
presence of an intruder is necessary. The robustness of both schemes towards an attack have been studied in this
article.
Keywords: Physical layer network coding (PLNC), Link layer network coding (LLNC), Pollution attack, Wireless
networks, Relay networks
1 Introduction
The main difference between a wireless and a wired net-
work is the fact that the signals can be broadcasted to
multiple users simultaneously. In order to improve the
four-stage traditional routing [1, 2], network coding has
been introduced to attain the maximum possible informa-
tion flow and to increase the network throughput [3–7].
Inspired by traditional network coding, physical layer
network coding (PLNC) has been proposed to improve
network throughput, reduce network congestion, and
improve network robustness [8, 9]. In wireless networks
with limited bandwidth and power resources, PLNC has
potential for significant performance improvements. This
is done by taking advantage of the inherent additive nature
of electromagnetic waves, demonstrating a better perfor-
mance with respect to the throughput of the network.
However, the additive nature of PLNC makes the network
susceptible to pollution attacks. Network coding (LLNC)
also allows corrupted packets to propagate widely and
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significantly affect the data recovery procedure. Previ-
ous works in network coding security emphasized on the
protection of data propagation procedures and the detec-
tion of pollution attacks [10–15]. Although these schemes
are elegant from the theoretical point of view, they are
not efficient with respect to cost and network throughput
when used in practice. When detection and elimination
methods are used at the network layer, the added com-
plexity and overhead make these higher layer methods
inefficient [16]. This calls for a robust coding method that
can tolerate intruder attacks without adding too much
control overhead to the network. In this paper, the over-
all network performance from a physical layer perspective
has been evaluated for the first time. The goal of this work
is to show that the PLNC schemes outperform the LLNC
schemes when it comes to an attack. Two cases where the
attack power remains low or high are studied.
The pollution attack concept at the network layer
has been introduced in [11]. With the advent of the
PLNC schemes, pollution attacks may be managed at
lower layers. It has been shown that the injected pack-
ets can be detected at the physical layer using maximum
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Razfar et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2017) 2017:6 Page 2 of 16
likelihood (ML) detection [16].Whenever a relay becomes
an intruder with a probability of P, the packet can be
restored by removing the faulty information using the
method presented in [16, 17]. However, this work has been
done at the packet level, while PLNC deals with the data
at the physical layer. PLNC is used in [18] to localize the
Sybil nodes in wireless networks. Nonetheless, the full
effect of the intruder on the network has yet to be inves-
tigated. Network coding based on DeNoise-and-Forward
(DNF) was introduced in [9] to enhance the conven-
tional wireless network design and to bring real gains in
a communication-theoretic sense. Based on this scheme,
optimized constellation for a two-way relaying channel
has been proposed in which a higher throughput com-
pared to LLNC scheme is promised [19]. Similar results
have been reported in [20, 21], where the authors confirm
the results of [19], analytically. This method is referred to
as Adaptive-DeNoise-and-Forward (ADNF hereafter). For
comparison purposes, the Amplify-and-Forward (AF) and
ADNF PLNC schemes with a lower and higher complexity
at the relay node are selected. More sophisticated schemes
such as Compute-and-Forward [22, 23] are not consid-
ered in this paper. However, the material introduced in
this paper can help the researchers study these schemes as
well. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, a comprehen-
sive study investigating the effect of the pollution attack
on the PLNC scheme has not been carried out before. The
goal of this paper is to investigate the effects of the pollu-
tion attack on the PLNC schemes (ADNF and AF), com-
pared to the LLNC scheme, and present a fair comparison
among them. What motivates the authors is to find out
which of the ADNF, AF, or LLNC schemes performs bet-
ter in the presence of an intruder. This work focuses on the
case where the intruder’s presence is not known to the net-
work. The comparison is carried out for different attack
scenarios. In this work, a detailed analysis of the error
probability for the PLNC schemes with an intruder is pro-
vided. The three schemes are being thoroughly analyzed
and compared. The closed-form error probability approx-
imation of the AF and LLNC schemes with and without an
intruder for the case where the users experience a Rician
fading and the intruder experiences a Rayleigh fading is
derived. This is based on the assumption that the users
operate in line of sight, while the intruder attempts to
hide and only relies on scattered and non-line-of-sight
operation. Note that the derivations for this type of net-
work (Rician-Rayleigh attack) are novel and have not been
evaluated before. The channel realization impact has also
been studied. That is, the simulation results for the case
where the users experience a Rayleigh fading (where there
is no LOS present) have been illustrated. To understand
the channel realization impact, simulation results for the
two cases where the users experience a Rayleigh fading
or a Rician fading with high Rician K-factor is presented
as well. A lower bound for the ADNF scheme with an
intruder is also presented.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as fol-
lows. The network model for the LLNC, AF, and ADNF
schemes with pollution attack scenario is presented in
Section 2. Performance of these three schemes is analyzed
in Section 3. Section 4 provides the numerical and simu-
lation results demonstrating the robustness of the PLNC
scheme in the presence of pollution attacks. Section 5
presents the discussions and conclusions.
2 Networkmodel
Throughout the paper, certain assumptions and notations
are applied. The users transmit their data using a gen-
eral M-PSK (M = 2k) modulation with gray mapping
regardless of the scheme. It is assumed that the M-PSK
constellation has unity energy. M denotes the constella-










. Noise is assumed to be circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian randomwith zeromean and
variance of σ 2. S1, S2, SI , and S are the digital source data
per symbol from users 1, 2, intruder, and relay, respec-
tively. That is, k-bit binary tuples (M = 2k) in ZM =
{0, 1, . . . ,M−1}. C is the denoising mapper. A quasi-static
slow fading with a certain Rician K-factor for users, and
Rayleigh fading for the intruder, is assumed. The sym-
bol I resembles the intruder. The transmission power of
the users and the relay is assumed to be the same and is
denoted as PS. An identical noise variance at the users and
the relay is also assumed, i.e., σ 21 = σ 22 = σ 2R = σ 2. In
the proposedmodel, the users communicate with the relay
with LOS similar to [19], while the intruder is assumed to
communicate without LOS. The most appropriate wire-
less channel model for these two cases are therefore Rician
and Rayleigh fading. This is justified noting the fact that
intruders often try to keep their locations and channel
state information (CSI) hidden to avoid being detected by
legitimate network users. Moreover, investigation of this
scenario is important, since it is highly probable that we
face heterogeneous networks. For simplicity, a reciprocal
channel for both stages is assumed.
In a two-way relay channel (TWRC) [24] with physi-
cal layer network coding, the throughput of the system
is increased dramatically when compared to the tradi-
tional network coding method. However, when a third
unexpected user (intruder) enters the network, one may
wonder how the network is going to handle the situa-
tion if corrupted packets are injected into the network.
In this work, a TWRC network model with an intruder
inside the network is analyzed. The intruder may attack
the relay and/or the users. It should be emphasized that
the “intruder” effect here differs from the conventional
interference effect in wireless networks. The difference is
Razfar et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2017) 2017:6 Page 3 of 16
that the intruder attacks the network in such a way that
its locations and channel status is unknown to the relay
[25]. Hence, the performance analysis should be treated
differently from the networks with conventional interfer-
ence. In general, one or multiple intruders may enter the
network. They inject data into the network to degrade the
performance. For simplicity, we evaluate the case with one
intruder. There are three main scenarios for an attack by
the intruder.
The first scenario is an attack on the relay only. Attacks
can occur when the relay is receiving the signals from the
two users. The relay is a natural target since corrupting
its packets can affect both users’ received signals. Another
scenario involves an attack on the users. These two nodes
would only be affected during the receiving of a signal
from the relay, and thus, the intruder has no interaction
with the relay. The last scenario consists of a combina-
tion of attacks on both sending nodes and the relay. In
this combination, the attacks occur both when the relay is
receiving the users’ signals and when the users are receiv-
ing the signal from the relay. Although the attack on both
the users and the relay is practical, the intruder has to
attack at both time slots which will exhaust its power.
Figure 1 shows the network model for a single intruder
attack on both LLNC and PLNC schemes. For the PLNC
scheme, the assumption is that the relay receives the sig-
nals at the same time from the two users. This allows us to
ignore the symbol-level synchronization effect. Nonethe-
less, symbol and phase synchronization among the nodes
for a TWRC model with no intruder have been stud-
ied in [8, 26] and more thoroughly in [27]. In [8] and
[27], the authors have shown that although the lack of
carrier-phase, carrier-frequency, and time-based synchro-
nizations does effect the network, the effect is gener-
ally acceptable in wireless environment. For the LLNC
scheme, it is assumed that the attack happens during the
first time slot. Since the relay is the most susceptible node
inside the network (due to multiple access interference),
the focus of this work is on a network with an attack on
the relay only. The intruder attacks the network at the
first time slot. This gives us a fair comparison where the
intruder is present only in one time slot for all schemes.
An example for networks with an intruder can be a wire-
less network with static wireless nodes, quasi-free-space
channel properties such as the ones observed in wire-
less sensor networks deployed in large areas [28]. Another
common scenario can be described with an example in a
wireless network for TWRC model where two users (cell
phones) try to communicate via a base station (relay).
A third example is satellite communication, wherein two
end nodes on the earth can only communicate with each
other via a satellite relay [8]. IEEE 802.11 packet exchange
can also be a good example for practical implementa-
tions of this scheme [29]. This gives us an insight for the
performance in a real-time scenario.
The attack model is simple. It is assumed that the
intruder uses the same type of device as the users [30].
This allows the intruder to avoid being detected. The
attack can occur with different attack-to-signal ratios
(ASRs) defined as the ratio of the average received attack
signal power to the user signal power. Note that the ASR
may vary randomly in a wireless transmission scenario. To
keep the comparison fair, this scenario is not illustrated.
The intruder modifies the received messages and thus
influences the demodulation/denoising of the received
data. Digital wireless attacks for signals such as Bluetooth
andWi-Fi are possible with very low power. For the trans-
mission power of the intruder (PI ), the example of reactive
(or responsive) attacker can be used where the intruder
looks for ongoing transmissions in order to compose their
Fig. 1 PLNC and LLNC network model with an intruder performing pollution attack
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attack signal (the intruder applies power management to
identify the appropriate direction of transmission, power,
and timing for its attack) [28]. Through the transmis-
sion of a high power signal on the same frequency of a
user, the intruder can create a competing signal that col-
lides with and, in effect, cancels out the users’ signal. Cell
phones (users), which are designed to increase power in
the case of low levels of interference, react to this inter-
ference. Consequently, the intruder must be aware of any
increases in power by the users andmatch that power level
accordingly. A type of reactive intruder called intelligent
intruder uses this knowledge to disrupt the communica-
tions. In fact, intelligent intruders could be considered as a
type of reactive intruders. By using intelligent attack tech-
niques, the attacker decreases its probability of detection
and consumption of energy than basic reactive one.
The details of LLNC, AF, and ADNF schemes are dis-
cussed next. Section 2.1 discusses the LLNC network
model, Section 2.2 discusses the AF network model, and
Section 2.2 describes the ADNF network model.
2.1 LLNC SystemModel
For the TWRC network model, the data transmission pro-
cess for LLNC and PLNC schemes is shown in Fig. 2. The
last two slots of a four-stage transmission are shortened
into one slot in LLNC scheme by allowing the relay to add
(XOR denoted by ⊕) the received symbols S1, and S2.
S = S1 ⊕ S2 (1)
The last time slot is where the relay broadcasts S back to
the users. The users will then be able to recover the infor-
mation from the other user by adding their own symbol to
the symbol received from the relay.
S2 = S ⊕ S1,
S1 = S ⊕ S2 (2)
Fig. 2 a LLNC. b PLNC
Let X1 and X2 be the modulated transmitted symbols of
the two transmitting nodes. From Fig. 1, at two consecu-
tive time slots, node k ∈ {1, 2} transmits its data to the
relay. The two received signals at the relay for the first time
slot, where the intruder is present, and for the second time





PIHIXI + NR (3)
YR2 =
√
PSH2X2 + NR (4)
where SI ∈ {ZM} is the intruder’s signal, M(SI) = XI is
the modulated signal, PI is the transmission power, HI is
the channel coefficient with Rayleigh distribution, all for
intruder, and NR is the noise at the relay. The relay detects











where Q(.) denotes hard decision. The relay broadcasts
the XOR version S = Sˆ1 ⊕ Sˆ2 for the case with no intruder
attack and S = Sˆ1|SI ⊕ Sˆ2 for the case with the intruder
attack of the demodulated symbols back to the user nodes.
For simplicity, reciprocal channel conditions are assumed




PSHkX + Nk (7)
where X = M(S). The two nodes detect the relay’s






The two users demodulate their detected symbols and
then extract the information from the other user as follows
S¯2 = SˆR1 ⊕ S1 (9)
S¯1 = SˆR2 ⊕ S2 (10)
PLNC, on the other hand, makes the process even faster
by combining the first two stages of the process. The users
are allowed to send the symbols during the same time slot.
At the second time slot, after processing, the relay broad-
casts the processed data back to the users. The two PLNC
network models are described next.
2.2 AF systemmodel
The AF model has two stages of operation. The first stage
is referred to as the MA stage, where the two users trans-
mit their data to the relay, simultaneously. The second
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stage is the relaying stage, where the relay performs a
combining operation on the received data (this can be
as simple as XOR in LLNC or more complicated as dis-
cussed later) and broadcasts the signal back to the users.
The main difference between the AF scheme and the
ADNF scheme is that during the MA stage, the relay only
amplifies the signal and broadcasts it back to the users.
Unlike the ADNF scheme, the AF scheme does not take
a more realistic wireless channel model (i.e., fading) into
account. As it can be seen later, due to this reason, the
AF idea falls behind the ADNF scheme in terms of per-
formance. However, when it comes to an attack, it is
unknown whether ADNF outperforms the AF scheme or
not. Hence, this work analyzes the performance of the AF
scheme in presence of an intruder as well.






PSH2X2 + att + NR (11)
where att = √PIHIXI . In a similar manner to [32], the





PS|H1|2 + PS|H2|2 + σ 2
(12)
It should be noted that the intruder term is not present
in the amplification factor. This is because the relay is
not aware of the CSI of the intruder’s channel. The relay
broadcasts the amplified signal XB = βRAF to the two
users. Perfect channel estimation at the users is assumed












) + Z2 + βH2att
(13)
where Zi = βHiNR + Ni and i ∈ {1, 2}. After self-
interference cancelation [32], the signals at the two users
can be written as
Aˆ1 =
√
PSβH1H2X2 + Z1 + βH1att
Aˆ2 =
√
PSβH2H1X1 + Z2 + βH2att
(14)
The signal-to-attack-and-noise Ratio (SANR) at user 1










σ 2 + PIβ2|H2|2|HI |2
(15)
For the case with no intruder attack, the term
PIβ2|Hi|2|HI |2, i ∈ 1, 2, will not be present.
2.3 ADNF systemmodel
The DNF was originally introduced in [9]. The goal of
DNF is to increase the throughput of the system when
compared to AF [29, 33] and Decode-and-Forwarding
(DF) [24, 34]. In the DF relaying, the relay combines the
data using XOR operation as shown in (1), while the
AF relaying allows the addition of the data provided by
the multiple access (MA) channel. In the AF method,
for high signal-to-noise ratios (SNR), the throughput is
twice as much as the traditional four-stage routing. The
problem with this method appears at low SNRs. This
results in erroneous received data and degrading network
throughput. DNF addresses this problem by not decod-
ing the data from the two users. Nonetheless, it can make
an estimate of the sum of the two signals coming from
the two users with the help of a decision process that
decreases the noise impact. This improvement makes the
DNF stand out among the two other methods. The mod-
ulation schemes optimized for the two-way relay channel
for ADNF has been investigated in [19]. Similar to AF
scheme, this scheme also has a two stage process. The two
stages are briefly explained next.
2.3.1 MA stage
During the MA stage, the users transmit their data using
QPSK modulation. The users send their data as X1 =
M(S1) and X2 = M(S2). A quasi-static and a perfect CSI
at the relay is assumed here. In other words, the channel
is constant for a block of transmission and varies indepen-
dently from one block to another. Each of the channels is
assumed to be slow fading. Imperfect channel estimation
(channel estimation error) has been studied in [35, 36],
where it has been shown that there exists a statistical
lower bound on the variance of estimation error that
allows operation with no network coding error. For sim-
plicity, however, this effect is not investigated in this paper
since the main goal of this work is to study the effect of the
pollution attack on the network. Extension of these results
to the case where the channels are not estimated perfectly
is straight forward. As shown in Fig. 1, during the first
time slot, the intruder attacks the network. The relay may
receive false information from the users due to the attack.





PSH2X2 + att + NR (16)
2.3.2 Relaying stage
The ML detection as shown in (17) is used at the relay to
get the estimates of the two users’ information based on
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The relay maps the received signal RADNF, using a
denoising function, into a quantized signal, XR. Note that
here, the relay is not aware of the third-party intruder
and only assumes that there are two users sending out
their data. Therefore, for the case where the users trans-
mit QPSK modulation, it uses the same code-maps and
table used in Fig. 4 and Table I of [19]. Moreover, the
relay performs the ML based on the information from the
two users and not the intruder. As mentioned in [19], for
higher order modulation schemes, a simplified code-map
is proposed that reduces the number of network codes
and limits or eliminates the usage of irregular modulations
at the BC stage. However, there are still many singular
fade states that can degrade the performance. The authors
in [37, 38] have shown that by utilizing convolutional
or LDPC codes, the performance of the network can be
improved.
The users receive the broadcasted signal code from the
relay under the quasi-static slow fading channel. This code
can have a cardinality greater than or equal to M (for
QPSK, M = 4), depending on the selected code-map,
where either M − PSK or (M + N) − QAM, (N ≥ 1)
will be broadcasted. For simplicity, a reciprocal channel
for both stages is assumed. Note that the denoising maps
are designed by minimizing the pairwise error probability
between the codewords at the MA stage and to maxi-
mize the minimum square distance between the constel-
lation points. In other words, the best denoising maps are
designed in favor of increasing the minimum Euclidean
distance. The squared Euclidean distance between the
data transmitted from the senders and its candidates, i.e.,








where (s, sˆ) = M(s) − M(sˆ). If the data pair is erro-
neous, that is, C(Sˆ1, Sˆ2) = C(S1, S2), the pairwise error
probability (PEP) is calculated as











where the last term comes from the Chernoff bound [39],
Q is the complementary Gaussian cumulative distribution
function defined in [39], and d2min is theminimum squared





For a channel realization H (H1 and H2), the overall
error probability at the relay is a weighted sum of all
the possible erroneous data pairs C(Sˆ1, Sˆ2) = C(S1, S2)
where the most dominant factor in calculating the over-
all error is the minimum Euclidean distance between
the data transmitted from the users and its candidates
[19]. This is shown in (21). It should be noted that since
the closed-form expression for the decision regions are
too complex to derive, the exact error probability cal-
culation is a complicated task. Hence, the PEP, which











(Sˆ1, Sˆ2) = (S′1, S′2), C(S′1, S′2) = (Sˆ1, Sˆ2)
) (21)
3 Performance analysis
Performance of LLNC, AF, and ADNF schemes are stud-
ied and compared in this section. Since the relay domi-
nates the network and is the most susceptible node in the
network [19], for the analysis purposes, the performance
of the network with an intruder attack on the relay is illus-
trated. The attack on the nodes (broadcast stage attack)
can be derived and illustrated in a similar manner and is
left as a future work.
3.1 LLNC performance evaluation
As previously shown in Fig. 2a and Eq. (1), the linear net-
work coding scheme is a three-stage relaying process that
boosts the throughput when compared to the traditional
four-stage relaying. The performance of the network with
and without the intruder is investigated.
3.1.1 Performance with no intruder
First case is when the probability of attack of the intruder
is zero (Pa = 0). The symbol error probability (SER) at the
relay Ps→r , at the users Pr→s, and at the end-to-end error
probability Pete is derived next.
In the first and second time slots, the SER at the relay is
calculated as [39]
Psj→r = P(Sˆj = Sj) (22)




, j ∈ {1, 2}, and dj is
the Euclidean distance between two M-PSK signal points.
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In calculating (22), the minimum Euclidean distance is
used. To calculate the average error probability, the inte-







bγ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
fγ (γ )dγ (24)
where (a, b) > 0 are modulation-specific constants. For
example, for high SNRs, and for QPSK modulation over





bility density function (PDF) of the Rician fading is written
as













where (γ ≥ 0), γ¯ is the average SNR, γ is defined as the
instantaneous SNR per symbol, i.e., γ = H2 PS
σ 2 , and I0(.)
is the zero-order modified Bessel function of the first kind
[40]. K is the Rician K-factor defined as the ratio of the
powers of the LOS component to the scattered compo-
nents. Substituting (25) into (24), and using the alternative
version of the Q function Qalt(u) = 1π ×
∫ π2
0 e
− u22 sin2 θ dθ














where Mγ (s) 
∫ ∞
0 esγ pγ (γ )dγ is the moment-
generating function (MGF) [40]. Next, using Eq. (5.11) in
[40], with some algebraic manipulation, the average SER









− K γ¯ sin2 θ
1+K+ 12 γ¯ sin2 θ
1 + K + 12 γ¯ sin2 θ
dθ (27)
In a similar way, the Pr→sj and P¯r→sj can be calculated.
The end-to-end error probability is directly affected by
the relay and the bit-wise XOR operation. Let Pxor =
P(S1 ⊕ S2 = Sˆ1 ⊕ Sˆ2), where S1 = Sˆ1 and S2 = Sˆ2, denote
the probability of error in decoding XOR-ed data at the
relay, given that both estimates of the two transmitted sig-
nals are in error. For a general M-PSK modulation, there
areM×M possible pair combinations. Excluding the cor-
rect pair, the XOR-ed error probability at the relay can
be calculated. For example, for a QPSK modulation, with-
out loss of generality, if the two users transmit the pair
(0,1), the possible erroneous decoded pairs at the relay
that will result in correct XOR operation are {(1,0), (3,2),
(2,3)}. The possible erroneous decoded pairs at the relay
that will result in wrong XOR operation are {(2,2), (3,3),
(1,2), (1,3), (3,0), (2,0)}. Furthermore, as mentioned in (22),
the error probability of decoding each individual pair with
one symbol per time slot depends on the Euclidean dis-
tance between the two QPSK signal points. Hence, Pxor =
1− 39 = 23 . For the transmitted pair (0, 1), Table 1 shows all
the possible nine pair combinations with their associated
probabilities.
















Assuming P¯s1→r ≈ P¯s2→r = P¯s→r , P¯relay can be written
as
Prelay ≈ P¯s→r(2 + P¯s→r(Pxor − 2)) (29)
The average end-to-end error probability from user 1 to
user 2 is written as
P¯ete1→2 ≈ (Prelay)(1 − P¯r→s2)
+ (1 − Prelay)(P¯r→s2)
+ (Prelay)(P¯r→s2)
= Prelay + P¯r→s2(1 − Prelay) (30)
Table 1 Probability of error for transmitted symbol pair (0,1) with the wrong estimated symbol pairs (σ 2 = 1)
Type (Sˆ1, Sˆ2) P1 = Q(2/
√
2) P2 = Q(√2/2) Pe Correct/erroneous XOR
Decoding
Desired incorrect pairs (1, 0) 0.0786 0.1587 P2 × P2 = 0.0252 Correct
(2, 3) 0.0786 0.1587 P2 × P2 = 0.0252 Correct
(3, 2) 0.0786 0.1587 P1 × P1 = 0.0062 Correct
Undesired incorrect Pairs (2, 2) 0.0786 0.1587 P2 × P1 = 0.0125 Erroneous
(3, 3) 0.0786 0.1587 P1 × P2 = 0.0125 Erroneous
(1, 2) 0.0786 0.1587 P2 × P1 = 0.0125 Erroneous
(1, 3) 0.0786 0.1587 P2 × P2 = 0.0252 Erroneous
(3, 0) 0.0786 0.1587 P1 × P2 = 0.0125 Erroneous
(2, 0) 0.0786 0.1587 P2 × P2 = 0.0252 Erroneous
Razfar et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2017) 2017:6 Page 8 of 16
3.1.2 Performance with an intruder
The performance of the network with the intruder (Pa =
1) is discussed here (“a” denotes attack). At the first time
slot, along with the transmission of the first node, the
intruder attacks the network. Same assumption has been
made in [41], where the eavesdropper starts overhearing
from the beginning of the time slot. The scenario is con-
sidered as the worst case scenario. It is assumed that the
relay is not aware of the attack inside the network. Assum-
ing that the intruder attack during the first time slot, the
error probability of the incorrectly estimated symbols at
the relay can be written as [39]










where d1I is the squared Euclidean distance between the
two M-PSK signal points [39] and is expressed as
d1I = |H1|2|M(S1) − M(Sˇ1)|2 (32)
where Sˇ1 is the estimate of the transmitted signal S1 based
on (4). The receiver, which is not aware of the intruder,
assumes a 4-point signal constellation for detection and
demodulation. However, if the intruder is somehow
detected by the receiver, the constellation map goes
beyond 4 points (16 points). Obviously the error prob-
ability would be improved and would be calculated in
a different manner. The average error probability at the
relay is
P¯relay|SI ≈ P¯s1→r|SI + P¯s2→r + P¯s1→r|SI P¯s2→r(Pxor − 2)
(33)
The only term in (33) that is needed to be calculated
is P¯s1→r|SI . To do so, we use the cumulative distribution
function -based approach that is widely used [42]. LetX =
PS|H1|2
σ 2 , and Z = PI |HI |
2
σ 2 . The SANR for user 1 to the relay
link can be written as γ1 = XZ+1 . Similar to the method
described in [42], in order to calculate the average error
probability, the outage probability needs to be evaluated.
The outage probability is known to be the probability that
γ1 falls below an acceptable SNR threshold γth and can be
written as
Pout = Fγ1(γth) = Pr(γ1 ≤ γth) (34)
where Pr(.) denotes the probability. Recall that the users’
channels are subject to a Rician fading. In order to
derive the outage probability of γ1 conditioned on Z,











where CX(.) = 1 − FX(.). Substituting the PDFs of the
intruder’s channel, which is Rayleigh distributed, as well as
the users channel into (35), and by using the infinite-series
representation of I0(.) in [43], Eq. (8.447.1), and with the
help of Eq. (3.351.2) in [43], the integral can be simplified
to






















e−γth(z+1)1(γth(z + 1))kfZ(z)dz (38)
























, 2 = γthγ¯z1+1γ¯z , and γ¯x, γ¯y, and
γ¯z are the average received SNRs of user 1, user 2, and
the intruder, respectively. Noting Eq. (3.382.4) in [43], and
some algebraic manipulations, the outage probability is
written as










2 (K1)i (k + 1,2)
i! k!1i−k+1γ¯z
(41)
where (., .) is the complementary incomplete gamma
function defined in [43], Eq. (8.350.2). The approxima-
tion comes from using the infinite series representation
of the gamma function. The average SER can be calcu-
lated using the widely used CDF-based approach [32]. For
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a general modulation type, the average error probability












































(Dγth + 1)l−k−1dγth (44)
Noting Eq. (3.383.5) in [43], the average error probabil-































where ψ(., ., .) is the Tricomi confluent hypergeometric
function as defined in [43], Eq. (9.211.4), and D = γ¯z1.
The closed-form expression does converge and can easily
be plotted in Matlab or other simulation software. For dif-
ferent values of γ¯z, it can be seen that the SER varies. The
average end-to-end error probability from node 1 to node
2 is
P¯ete1→2|SI ≈ Prelay|SI + P¯r→s2(1 − Prelay|SI ) (46)
3.2 AF performance evaluation
The performance without an intruder with Pa = 0 is
evaluated next.
3.2.1 Performance with no intruder
In order to evaluate the error probability, the outage prob-
ability needs to be calculated. The method described in
[32] is used here. Let X = PS|H1|2
σ 2 , Y = PS|H2|
2
σ 2 . By
substituting (12) into (15) without the intruder term and
applying algebraic manipulation, it can be shown that the
effective SNRs at the two users are given by
γ1 = XY2X + Y + 1
γ2 = XY2Y + X + 1
(47)
It has been shown in [44] that γ1 > γ2 if Y > X and
γ2 > γ1 if X > Y . Therefore, the outage probability is
expressed as
Pout = P(min{γ1, γ2} < γth)
= 1 − P(γ1 > γth, γ2 > γth)
= 1 − P(γ1 > γth|X > Y ) − P(γ2 > γth|Y > X)
= 1 − (P1 + P2)
(48)
Next, using [32] and [44], and after some simple alge-

















) fX(x)dxfY (y)dy (50)
where fX(x) and fY (y) are the PDFs of the Rician-
distributed random variables (RV) X and Y, respectively.
P2 can be calculated in a similar manner. The limits on
the integral comes from the conditions in (47). Since eval-
uating (50) is a cumbersome task, for high SNRs, the
integration region of the variable x can be reduced to
(y,∞). It can be shown that the average SER of the net-









; 3 = 1 +2; γx, γ¯y and γ¯z are the average SNRs
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3.2.2 Performance with an intruder
Performance of the network with an intruder is studied
next. For all the schemes, the intruder attacks during the
first time slot (MA stage). In order to evaluate the error
probability, the outage probability needs to be calculated.
The method described in [32] is being used here. Let X =
PS|H1|2
σ 2 , Y = PS|H2|
2
σ 2 , and Z = PI |HI |
2
σ 2 . Now, by substituting
(12) into (15) and applying algebraic manipulation, it can
be shown that the effective SANRs at the two users are
given by
γ1 = XY2X + Y + XZ + 1
γ2 = XY2Y + X + YZ + 1
(52)
Following the same method used in the case with no
intruder attack and with some simple algebraic manipula-
tions, P1 can be written as








where fX(x) and fY (y) are the PDFs of the Rician-
distributed RV X and Y , respectively, V1 = γth(1+Y )Y−2γth−Zγth ,
V2 = 2γth + Zγth, PSY = ψ
(
l + 12 ,m + 12 , b+23)N
)
,
and EZ is the expected value over complex value, Z.
The limits on the integral comes from the conditions in
(52). The expected value is to evaluate the effect of the
intruder on the network. Since evaluating the integral
above is a cumbersome task, for high SNRs, the integral
region of the variable x can be reduced to (y,∞). Sim-
ilar assumption has been applied in [32, 44]. Appendix
proves that for high SNRs, the average SER of the network
can be expressed as (54). The closed-form expression
in (54) shows the impact of the intruder on the net-
work. It can be seen that as the power of the intruder
increases, the SER decreases. This equation does con-






























3.3 ADNF performance evaluation
For the ADNF scheme, the performance of the network is
studied next. Similar to the previous sections, for a net-
work with an intruder, the focus of this paper is on theMA
stage as it dominates the overall system performance.
3.3.1 Performance with no intruder
The first case occurs when the probability of an attack
by an intruder is zero (Pa = 0). The average error prob-
ability at the relay is due to three kinds of errors: first,
the average probability that user 2 has its data decoded
correctly at the relay and user 1 has not; second, the aver-
age error probability that user 1 has its data decoded
correctly by the relay and user 2 has not; and third, the
average cluster error probability (P¯CEP) that the relay
incorrectly decodes to (Sˆ1, Sˆ2) ([21] equation 11). The
average SER at the relay is upper bounded as shown
in [21]
P¯relay ≤ 2P¯sj→r + P¯CEP (55)
The error probability at the users, Pr→s, is a func-
tion of the modulation scheme and transmitted code. For
the method where the irregular modulation schemes is
deployed to enhance the overall network performance,
a special case for the QPSK modulation scheme is pre-
sented. If no irregular modulation scheme is used, the
performance analysis becomes straightforward. In the BC
stage, following the channel conditions [19], either QPSK
or 5QAM is selected. Let C(S2, S1) = C and C(Sˆ2, Sˆ1) = Cˆ.
The error probability at the users can be written as
Pr→s = αPQPSK(Cˆ = C)+(1−α)P5QAM(Cˆ = C) (56)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the QPSK occurrence factor,




, j ∈ {1, 2}, which can be
calculated using (58), and, dj is the Euclidean distance of
two QPSK signal points based on C and Cˆ of the corre-
sponding node. Our simulation results show that both the
cardinalities (4 and 5) are equally likely to be used; hence,
α =12 is used hereafter. The error probability of 5QAM
can be found using Fig. 3. Since the exact error proba-
bility is difficult to obtain due to asymmetrical shape of
the 5QAM, we approximated the error probability in the
following manner. The asymptomatic optimized 5QAM
has been designed using sphere packing approach in [19].
To obtain a unity average power per symbol, the radius
R has been calculated. Since the minimum Euclidean dis-
tance between all the constellation points are the same
(dmin = 2 ∗ R = 1.2456), the error probability of 5QAM
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Fig. 3 5QAM constellation showing the minimum distance
dmin = 1.2456 and the radius R = 0.6228 [19]






denote the probability of decoding a wrong symbol from a




P(Sˆi = Si), i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
≈ 45Q(Z) + 2 ×
2
5Q(Z) + 2 ×
3
5Q(Z)
= 145 Q(Z) (57)
Note that (57) has not been derived in [19]. As also
mentioned in [19], the 5QAM shows a 1.1-dB loss when
compared to QPSK. However, 5-ary denoising can avoid
the distance shortening that does happen in the MA
access due to the interference of the signals. Our analy-
sis confirms the statement mentioned in [19]. The average
error probability of 5QAM over Rician fading channel can
be obtained by plugging in the average SER of 5QAM






(24) with the similar steps followed as the SER for QPSK.










− 0.385K γ¯ sin2 θ1+K+0.385γ¯ sin2 θ
)
1 + K + 0.385γ¯ sin2 θ dθ
(58)
The average end-to-end error probability can be written
as
P¯ete ≤ Prelay + P¯r→s(1 − Prelay) (59)
The above equation shows that the overall error prob-
ability is directly proportional to the error happening at
both the MA and BC stages, where the MA stage is the
dominant factor due to the addition of the two signals
(MA interference).
3.3.2 Performance with an intruder
The effect of the intruder on the network is studied next
(Pa = 1). Note that the estimates of the transmitted sig-
nals are based on (11). The relay, without any knowledge
of the intruder, considers a 16-point constellation point at
the receiver. If the relay was aware of the intruder and its
channel state information, other steps could be applied to
avoid the high error probability that is being caused by the
attack. In this case, the constellation map at the receiver
becomes 64 points rather than 16. Therefore, the code-
maps in Fig. 4 of [19] have to be changed and applied
accordingly.
Using (55), the average error probability can be written
as
P¯relay|SI ≤ 2P¯sj→r|SI + P¯CEP|SI (60)
where P¯sj→r|SI is the probability of the point-to-point
fading channels given an intruder is present inside the
network, which is calculated using (45) in the previous
section. The average cluster error probability given the
intruder is present inside the network is defined as follows
P¯CEP|SI = P{(S1, S2) → (S′1, S′2)}|SI (61)
In other words, PCEP is the probability that the relay
incorrectly decodes to (S′1, S′2), with the two pairs,{(S′1, S′2), (S1, S2)}, not being present in the same cluster.
This probability is written at the top of the next page.
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With the help of the line of proof in [21] that did not
consider an intruder, for a network with an intruder, the
average CEP can be written as (62). Substituting SANR
into ([21] equation 11), the average CEP can be written as
(63). The following definitions from [21] are necessary to
understand (63). Si = Si − S′i, i ∈ {1, 2}, and δs repre-
sents the largest radius of the enclosed circle in the region
associated with a specified singular fade state in which it
can be removed by the clustering. For the ADNF scheme,
SANR is defined as signal power to attack and noise power
ratio and is written as SANR = PSPI+σ 2 . Note that the relay
does not factor in the intruder in its estimates [21]. As we
see later, the results shown in (63) explains the severity of
intruder effect on this scheme.
4 Numerical and simulation results
4.1 Network coding-SER analysis
The SER comparison among four schemes is shown in
Fig. 4. It illustrates the theoretical and simulation plot of
average end-to-end SER vs. SNR with no intruder. For
comparison purposes, the Non-Adaptive-Denoise-and-
Forward scheme (fixed network coding) [21] denoted as
NADNF has also been shown in this figure. It is assumed
that the intruder uses QPSK modulation with gray map-
ping. The attack can occur with different ASRs. The
threshold SNR is chosen as γth = 2-dB. Table 2 describes
the simulation setup.
It is observed that the LLNC scheme outperforms the
other three schemes. This superiority is small when com-
pared to the ADNF scheme but is noticeable when com-
pared to the AF scheme. The inferiority is due to the effect
of MA interference, where users send their signal at the
same time during the MA stage. This effect is the high-
est for the AF scheme, where the amplification of noise
degrades the performance. For the ADNF scheme, at high





















Fig. 4 SER comparison of the four schemes over Rician fading
channel (K = 1)
Table 2 Simulation parameters
Attribute Value
Number of symbols 1536 × 104
Attack to signal ratio (ASR) 0.1 − 1
Modulation scheme (users) QPSK
Modulation scheme (intruder) QPSK
Modulation scheme (relay) QPSK/5QAM
γth 2 dB
SNRs, the CEP can be removed by removing the singu-
lar points, which results in a better performance than the
NADNF scheme. Note that the two singular points 0 and
∞ are inevitable. This explains the effect of fading on the
MA schemes. For the AWGN channel, however, PLNC
outperforms the LLNC scheme [8]. Having said that, the
time efficiency of the two time slot schemesmakes the two
PLNC schemes superior to the LLNC scheme in terms of
end-to-end throughput.
Next, the results for the case when the intruder is inside
the network is illustrated. The users experience a Rician
fading (with a Rician Factor K = 1) and the intruder
experiences a Rayleigh fading (K = 0). The performance
comparison of the three schemes LLNC, ADNF, and AF
with an intruder is illustrated in Fig. 5. The ASR varies
between 0.1 and 1. The intruder attacks the relay in the
first time slot for all the schemes. It can be seen that
ASR directly affects the performance. Noting the fact that
MA stage dominates the network performance, it can be
seen that the relay is the most susceptible node inside the
network. It can also be seen that as ASR increases, the
performance of AF and LLNC schemes get closer towards
each other. The ADNF scheme has the worst performance



















Fig. 5 SER comparison of the three schemes with an intruder with
different ASRs
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amongst all the other schemes. The reason behind this is
the fact that the ADNF scheme uses denoising maps that
are used for a network with two users and one relay. Since
the relay is not aware of the intruder, it makes the esti-
mates only based on the two users. Hence, the effect of
intruder becomes much more visible. This is less severe
for the AF and LLNC schemes, where the complexity of
relay’s operation is much less resulting in a less destruc-
tive attack. It can be inferred from the figure that for
lower ASRs (ASRs < 0.1), the situation becomes different
where the ADNF scheme performs better than AF. This
is because the intruder becomes less destructive (lower
power) and its effect on MA stage will be negligible. It
should be noted that for a network with fading channels
(mainly for wireless applications), regardless of an attack,
the LLNC scheme performs better than all other schemes
in terms of end-to-end SER.
4.2 Network coding-throughput analysis
Since the end-to-end throughput is an important param-
eter in evaluating the performance of the network, the
results are demonstrated based on this factor as well.
Throughput factors time into the account, which makes
PLNC schemes more efficient than the LLNC. The data
to be transmitted is encapsulated in a packet with the
length of 256 symbols. A quasi-static slow-fading channel
is assumed. The packet erasuremodel is being used, where
the probability of successful transmission (or the proba-
bility that a packet is received successfully at the receiver)
is defined as
Psuccess = P(SNR ≥ ),Pa = 0 (64)
Psuccess = P(SANR ≥ ),Pa = 1 (65)
where  is chosen to be 2 dB and SANR is defined as the




PIH2I + σ 2
, i ∈ {1, 2} (66)
As mentioned earlier, the intruder attacks the network
in the first time slot. The three figures, Figs. 6, 7 and 8,
show the end-to-end throughput for the three schemes
with an intruder attacking the relay with different ASRs.
It can be seen that ASR directly affects the performance.
Another observation is the fact that when the ASR is
below a certain threshold, the performance stays within a
reasonable range and the throughput does not drop sig-
nificantly. However, this would not be the case for the
BC stage attack since the intruder only affects one of the
nodes. These results do make sense due to the fact that
all nodes are unaware of the presence of the intruder and
the relay assumes that there are only two nodes present
in the network. For ASRs ≥ 0.1, it can be seen that
the AF scheme outperforms ADNF and LLNC schemes

































Fig. 6 End-to-end throughput of the three schemes with ASR = 0
(no attack)
at high SNRs. The ADNF scheme also outperforms the
LLNC scheme at high SNRs, if the ASRs are kept below
a certain threshold. Note that the ADNF scheme uses the
code-maps illustrated in Fig. 4 and Table I in [19], which
are not the best code-maps for the situation, where a
third user/intruder is present. In order to improve the
performance of this scheme, either the code-maps need
to be changed or the relay may use detection schemes
to estimate the CSI to eliminate the intruder. In both
cases, the relay does need to be aware of the intruder
inside the network. One way to ensure this is to have the
intruder attack with a high power. In practical cases, the
intruder attacks with a low ASR (ASRs < 0.1) to remain
undetectable. Therefore, the ADNF scheme will always
outperform the AF and LLNC scheme at high SNRs for
practical scenarios.































Fig. 7 End-to-end throughput of the three schemes with ASR = 0.5
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Fig. 8 End-to-end throughput of the three schemes with ASR = 1
4.3 Channel realization impact
So far, it is assumed that there is a direct LOS between
the users and the relay node while the intruder’s channel
is subjected to Rayleigh fading. However, it is a common
scenario, where the users can be a in dense environment,
where there is no direct LOS between the users and the
relay (K = 0). As it can be seen from Fig. 9, the over-
all throughput of the network degrades for the ADNF, AF,
and LLNC schemes when compared to the case where
the users experience a Rician fading. This performance
degradation is more visible for the ADNF scheme. This
is due to the fact that the performance improvement by
5-ary denoising becomes minimal at a low or zero Rician
K-factor. That is, the optimized constellation mapping
loses its efficiency in choosing the best network map to
increase the minimum distance profile as K decreases. As






























Fig. 9 End-to-end throughput of the three schemes with ASR = 0.5
under Rayleigh-Rayleigh fading
the Rician K-factor increases (K = 10), the performance
of the ADNF scheme improves significantly with a higher
Rician K-factor (where there is a LOS) when compared to
the AF scheme as explained in [19]. This can be observed
in Fig. 10. However, due to the destructive nature of the
attack and the design of the relay node, in the ADNF
scheme, the performance falls below the AF scheme at
high SNRs. In summary, the performance of the network
does get impacted by the channel model and does degrade
if the LOS disappears. However, the attack power is the
dominant factor in the performance degradation.
5 Conclusions
In this work, the effects of pollution attack on the perfor-
mance of the three schemes ADNF, AF, and LLNC at the
physical layer are investigated. The analytical approxima-
tion results for the SER performance of the three schemes
with and without an intruder have been illustrated as
well. From an end-to-end SER perspective, it has been
shown that LLNC scheme outperforms the ADNF and AF
schemes regardless of the presence of the intruder. With
the end-to-end throughput perspective, it has been shown
that with an intruder in the network, and with reason-
ably high ASRs, the AF outperforms ADNF and LLNC
schemes at high SNRs. It has also been observed that
ADNF scheme does outperform the other schemes if the
ASRs are kept low (for a realistic wireless environment). In
order for the ADNF scheme to perform better, complexity
of the system has to be increased, where the denois-
ing maps need to be redesigned for a larger network. A
future direction is to evaluate the network performance
with a channel that experiences large-scale fading, where
the distance between nodes (or the intruder) becomes an
important factor in network behavior. One can evaluate
other types of attacks. For instance, the intruder may use

































Fig. 10 End-to-end throughput of the three schemes with ASR = 0.5
under Rician-Rayleigh fading (K = 10)
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other modulation schemes to attack the network. Appro-
priate counterattack schemes for this model are also left as
a future work. One important future work that can lead us
to an unsolved problem is when the relay is aware of the
presence of an intruder. So far, the relay has only assumed
that there are only two users in the network; therefore,
the code-maps are designed accordingly. Although the
intruder can not be considered a valid node, it gives us a
good way of dealing with multiple nodes in the network
and scaling up PLNC to multiple nodes.
Appendix
By inserting the PDFs of the two users in (53), (67) is
derived, where γ¯x and γ¯y are the average received SNRs,
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The exact closed form of (67) is unknown. However, by
using the infinite-series representation of I0(.) in [43], Eq.









, and after some algebraic manip-
ulations, this integral is shown in (68). Using Eq. (3.351.2)
in [43], (68) is further simplified to (69). Recall that Z =
PI |HI |2
σ 2 , and the intruder experienced a Rayleigh fading,






After inserting (74) into (69), and using Eq. (3.382.4) in
[43], and after some algebraic manipulations, the integra-
tion with respect to z results in (71), where3 = 1+2,
4 = γthγ¯z3+1γ¯z , and (., .) is the complementary incom-
plete gamma function defined in [43], Eq. (8.350.2). The
outage probability can be written as (71). By inserting
(72) into (42), applying Eq. (3.383.5) in [43], and apply-
ing rigorous algebraic manipulation, the average SER of
the network can be expressed as (73). Here, ψ(., ., .) is the
Tricomi confluent hypergeometric function as defined in
[43], Eq. (9.211.4), and N = γ¯z3. This completes the
proof.
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